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so far as the paper by Dalgairns, even if allowed to have been "masterly"—it certainly was able—at the time it appeared. For thought has surely not stood still, even on the personality of God, during the last three decades, and in so small a bibliography, it is most essential that the student be somewhat up to date in his reading and sources. No references are given, in this section, to relative German literature. Martineau and Ritschl form the subjects of the last two chapters edited by Dr. Mackintosh. Martineau forms the theme of the next chapter. The introductory notice is appreciative, but it is a pity that, in the notes, the student is left in so unsatisfactory a position as to Martineau's real attitude on Freewill. Also, some meagreness attends the references. The work closes with a section on Ritschl, which seems carefully done.

Though I have deemed it necessary to say some things of more or less critical character, yet, taking the work as a whole, it is a welcome and highly useful addition to theological literature, and both editors are to be congratulated on the high measure of success they have attained in their praiseworthy task.

Kilmarnock, Scotland.

JAMES LINDSAY.

ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS. By A. E. Taylor, Fellow of Merton College, Oxford; John Fotheringham Professor of Philosophy in McGill University, Montreal; late lecturer in Owens College, Manchester. Methuen & Co. Pp. xvi, 419.

In the volume under review Mr. Taylor has given us an exposition of the principles of metaphysics from a point of view which is in the main that of Mr. Bradley. In doing so he has not failed to make use of the important works by Professors Ward, Royce, and others, which have seen the light since "Appearance and Reality" was published, while his own treatment of the subject is often both new and suggestive. Nevertheless, his book may, I think, be fairly regarded as an attempt to present its subject in as positive and constructive a manner as is possible without relinquishing the fundamental positions of Mr. Bradley with regard to the nature of thought and reality. If, notwithstanding the expository skill of the author and the many excellencies of his treatment of special questions, the main contentions of his work do not appear convincing to the present writer, it is mainly because of a suspicion, which will not be allayed, that the principles in question do not really admit of any positive construction whatever.

Mr. Taylor divides his work into four books, the first of which is devoted to a preliminary discussion of the problem, method and subdivisions of metaphysics. This is followed by a discussion in Book II of the general structure of Reality, including, in addition to an attempt to indicate the nature of the Absolute, the consideration of the most universal categories by which science and common sense seek to determine the world of things. The remaining books deal with the more special questions involved in the interpretation of nature and the interpretation of life.

We are brought, then, face to face at the start with the question of the nature of ultimate reality. To this question Mr. Taylor returns in its essentials the answer of Mr. Bradley. Reality must be conceived as an all-inclusive, perfectly consistent system, the materials of which are immediate experience. Separate chapters are devoted to the development of the implications of its experiential nature and to the consideration of the nature of the unity of the system. In the first of these, Mr. Taylor lays great stress upon the purposive character of all experience, in the uniqueness of which he finds the key to the meaning of individuality. In defining reality as experience we have therefore by implication asserted that it is thoroughly purposive and uniquely individual. Failure to realise the logical character of the unity of the Absolute and undue emphasis upon its merely numerical unity are signalled as errors into which monism in the past has fallen. Further, in endeavoring to conceive the nature of the system which constitutes reality, equal justice must be done to the aspects of unity and multiplicity. These must be apprehended as equally real and real through each other. This condition can only be realised if the whole constitutes an individual experience of which the partial constituents are experiences. When we seek to substitute a more concrete conception for this very abstract formula we have at best only the analogies of our own personal and social consciousness. Mr. Taylor discusses the value of these and decides, mainly on the ground of the greater self-sufficiency of a society, that while both self and society must be pronounced to be finite appearance, "of the two, society exhibits the fuller and higher individuality, and is, therefore, the more truly real" (p. 351). Indeed "if the absolute cannot be called a society without qualification, at any rate human society affords the best analogy by which we can attempt to represent its systematic unity in a concrete conceptual form" (p. 350).

I have endeavored above to present in outline the constructive side of Mr. Taylor's theory of Reality. We must now notice the tendencies which are traceable to his acceptance of Mr. Bradley's logic. Although the whole system and its constituent members are equally real, and real "in and through and for each other," we find "the completed system as it is for itself" identified with Reality *par excellence*, of which the partial constituents are appearances. What, one wants to know, are these partial constituents for the whole itself? Are they still appearance, that is to say, something that is not in the full sense real? Unless they are still only appearance, reality and appearance are spoken of from different points of view, and the designations are misleading. If they are still only appearance, the claims of the multiplicity of the system to equal justice with its unity have not been met. Again, although we are to interpret individuality in terms of the unique realisation of purpose, comprehensiveness is taken as a coördinate mark of individuality with internal systematisation. This seems to me a reversion to the lower category of whole and part. Finally, we are warned that we cannot say without reservation that Reality is an ordered system, since the idea of system implies the operation of the distinguishing intellect which, as such, involves falsification. The immediacy which is ascribed to the experience which constitutes the Absolute must be understood in a sense which excludes all distinctions. Mr. Taylor endeavors to make more comprehensible Mr. Bradley's postulate of a form of experience which shall be immediate in this sense and yet preserve in some way all the distinctions which we find in the world of appearances by a comparison with the cultivated appreciation of a complicated æsthetic whole and with the experience of personal love. The analogy, of course, is at best an imperfect one, since these forms of consciousness are not entirely immediate in the sense required. Its appropriateness at all would seem to depend upon the assumption that the non-immediate aspect of these experiences is not of their essence, an assumption for which I can see no justification whatever. These examples, then, it seems to me, fail to show that the results of thought can be preserved in a form of consciousness from which thought itself has been entirely eliminated, and we must, I think, look elsewhere for our deliverance from the empty mysticism which Mr. Taylor proclaims the necessity of avoiding.

In support of his contention of the necessary failure of all forms of thought, Mr. Taylor reproduces Mr. Bradley's argument that any recognition of relations involves the indefinite regress, and is therefore self-contradictory, and examines the attempts which have been made to turn this position. He seems to me to succeed in showing that Professor Royce's way of escape is not a satisfactory one, but hardly deals sufficiently seriously with the more recent criticism of Professor Stout.

It is impossible to do more here than indicate the nature of the questions discussed by Mr. Taylor under the head of cosmology. In successive chapters he treats of the problems of matter, the meaning of law, space and time, some conditions of evolution and the character of descriptive science, all of these topics being dealt with in an interesting way.

In the forefront of his discussion of the fundamental questions concerning the life of mind Mr. Taylor places the determination of the logical character of psychology. The various social and historical sciences "all involve the use of such psychological categories as those of *self*, *will*, *thought*, *freedom*, and thus any sound interpretation of history and society must begin with investigation into the logical character of the science to which these concepts belong" (p. 295). Moreover, idealist metaphysicians are constantly in danger of treating these categories as if they were possessed of an absolute validity. We can, however, Mr. Taylor thinks, cut the ground from under them by showing that the subject-matter of psychology is highly artificial and far removed from concrete actuality. Psychology, then, we are told, presupposes an "artificial severance of the unity of direct experience into a physical order and a non-physical realm external to that order" (p. 287). The psychologist does not deal with the actual experiences of living subjects, but with symbols which he substitutes for these as the result of an elaborately artificial method of transformation. This procedure is, however, justified, because we can interpret these symbols by indicating the physical conditions and expression of the so-called "mental state;" and this science of symbols is necessary both as a temporary stop-gap, pending the development of physiology, and to afford "a set of symbols suitable for the description, in abstract general terms, of the teleological processes of real life, and thus providing Ethics and History and their kindred studies with an appropriate terminology" (p. 305). Now it is, of course, true that psychol-

ogists have often defined the subject-matter of their science as if it constituted a realm which is somehow distinct from and coördinate with a realm of physical fact, but it is also true that this is a position which is now rejected by the psychologists who have given most attention to the determination of the standpoint of the science. Psychology, according to them, investigates the process of individual experience. If one asks why it is that such a position appears impossible to Mr. Taylor, the answer would seem to be that it is ruled out as inconsistent with his conception of the real nature of experience. Real experience is for him, as we have seen, immediate in the sense that it excludes all thought discrimination. As such, it cannot be described in general terms, for the curious reason that before we could so describe it "we must cease to feel or apprehend directly and go on to reflect upon and analyze the contents of our experience" (p. 30). Thus, so far from its being recognised that the process of thought is itself as genuine and "immediate" an experience as any, we are told to regard the total experience of which it is a constituent as somehow contaminated by its presence. But surely the truth is that the experience which is really direct and immediate is the experience of which some amount of thought reference is always a function, while the conception of an experience from which it is entirely absent is merely a hypothetical construction, which we may find useful and necessary for the interpretation of forms of conscious life which are not directly cognisable. Nor does there seem to be any reason why we should not succeed in characterising an experience so conceived as the result of reflection upon our own experience and the observation of its physical expression. Nay, even Mr. Taylor himself speaks of experience which is immediate in his sense as purposive. We need not, then, I think, accept the unsatisfactory conclusion that the only real, concrete experience is something akin to a merely feeling experience, about which we can say nothing because in order to characterise it we should have to be ourselves in a state akin to a merely feeling experience, in which *ipso facto* all characterisation would be an impossibility.

I have above drawn attention to what appear to me to be the most fundamental positions in Mr. Taylor's book, and these unfortunately are positions which I am not myself able to accept. This disagreement is, however, by no means inconsistent with a full recognition of the many merits of Mr. Taylor's work, and

of the value and suggestiveness of his treatment of various metaphysical topics. His book is certainly one which all who are interested in the present position of metaphysics ought to read.

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THE PATHWAY TO REALITY. Stage the Second. Being the Gifford Lectures delivered in the University of St. Andrews in the Session 1903-1904. By the Right Honourable Richard Burdon Haldane, M. P., LL. D., K. C. London: John Murray, 1904. Pp. xxvii, 275.

Mr. Haldane explains in his preface that the lectures of this, like those of the previous series, were for the most part not written. Although the subject has engaged his studies during a good part of his life, the lectures as delivered were *extempore* talks, which were taken down in shorthand at the time, and have simply been corrected for publication. Compelled to this plan by lack of leisure, Mr. Haldane admits that "such a method of producing a metaphysical book has defects."

One cannot but agree that such a method, however well adapted to the original purpose of a course of lectures, is not a suitable method for producing a metaphysical book. What a lecture properly aims at is to put some subject or problem before us in a broad and striking way, so that we may be incited to work it out into definite shape for ourselves by means of reading and reflection. Consequently in a lecture stimulus and suggestiveness are far more important than a rigid sequence and exact definition of ideas. Now, it is evident enough that for this essential work of the lecturer Mr. Haldane has great gifts, and that he is capable, as the present volume shows, of remarkable achievements. In the art of free, or *extempore*, discourse as applied to philosophy, he can have few rivals. The very qualities which become defects of form in the book were no doubt aids to effectiveness in the lectures—the repetitions and reiterations, the discursiveness, the frequent illustrations from poetry, the references to the latest philosophical fashions. Still, with all respect for the gifts of the lecturer, one must judge the book as a book. And what we look for in a book—which we can study at our leisure—is just that close sequence and precise definition of ideas, which the lecturer is more free to disregard. For if these qualities make the lecture difficult to follow, they make the book easy to use. And